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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Initial public offering (IPO) is a favorite investing channel particularly because of 
the stock’s tendency to be priced under its real value. This underpricing 
phenomenon prompts a large initial return for investors once the stock starts to 
circulate on an exchange. The return rate is especially high in developing 
countries, and therefore attracts great interest from international investors. 
Vietnam is among the most promising markets, yet there is a serious shortage of 
valuable knowledge about IPOs that prevents investors from tapping a lucrative 
investing opportunity. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to aid investors in venturing into Vietnamese equity 
markets. Specifically, the author examines, as a case study, the Ho Chi Minh 
Stock Exchange and various issues surrounding IPOs in that market. The results 
aim to clarify the feasibility of IPOs as an investing channel, and determine 
factors influencing underpricing level. This study utilizes the deductive method 
with a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches. Data was collected 
from a number of sources, ranging from books, journals and reports to personal 
observations and financial databases. Moreover, the author gained invaluable 
insights from interviews with experts in the investment banking business. 
 
An investigation into the underpricing level of IPOs and the determinants of 
underpricing is presented in the empirical portion of the thesis. The author 
examines return rate across different time frames, taking into account local 
features and return rates of comparable markets. Next, analysis on the 
determinants of the underpricing level identifies the weight of each factor on the 
underpricing level. Finally, a multiple regression analysis is conducted to affirm 
the findings in this study. 
 
Findings in the empirical part suggest a substantial return rate compared to other 
markets. Thus the author finds investing in Vietnamese IPOs to be very 
advantageous and advises international investors to do so. Moreover, two stock 
portfolios are provided. Each portfolio describes characteristics of a typical 
underpriced stock, and provides a list of companies that fit these criteria. These 
characteristics should serve as guidance for investors looking to invest in 
Vietnamese IPOs. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
Auction day On the auction day investors compete with each others 
to get IPO stocks, which will be allocated to the 
highest bidders. 
EUR  Euro 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
HNX  Hanoi Stock Exchange 
HOSE  Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange 
IPO  Initial Public Offering 
JSC  Joint Stock Company 
Listing The act of putting a company’s stock on a stock 
exchange. 
Money left on the table When stocks are underpriced, the offering company 
cannot raise as much money as it could when share’s 
price is evaluated correctly. The untouched money is 
referred to as “money left on the table”. 
POE  Private-owned enterprise 
Road show Meeting between the IPO issuers and investors, where 
the issuers give presentation about the upcoming initial 
public offering  
ROI  Return on Investment 
SOE  State-owned enterprise 
SSC  State Securities Commission of Vietnam 
Underpricing The pricing of an initial public offering below their 
real value. This undervaluation is evident at the first 
trading day when share price jumps to their true worth, 
resulting in a large return for investors. 
Underwrite One or several investment banks guarantee that a 
company will receive the expected capital from its 
IPO, regardless of demand. If the offering shares are 
undersubscribed, the banks will buy the remaining 
shares. 
Underwriter  One who underwrites an initial public offering 
VND  Vietnam Dong 
 
 
 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background information 
 
In the publication entitled “The World in 2050”, PricewaterhouseCoopers asserts 
that Vietnam will be among the top 20 largest economies in the world by 2050, 
ranking at 14 and ahead of Italy, South Korea and Spain (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2011, 9). This is a remarkable prediction, given the size and level of development 
of the Vietnamese economy at this point. Still, the forecast is consistent with 
previous claims made in prior versions of this publication both before and during 
the financial crisis, in 2006 and 2008 respectively. In the immediate future, 
though, it is clear that Vietnam is receiving tremendous interest from investors. JP 
Morgan named Vietnam one of the “Frontier Five” markets worth investigating, 
together with Kazakhstan, Bangladesh, Nigeria and Kenya (JP Morgan 2007, 3). 
Mark Mobius, head of emerging market division of the EUR 458.4 billon Franklin 
Templeton funds, states that Nigeria, Vietnam and Kazakhstan are "frontier" 
markets Franklin Templeton expects to place its biggest bets on in 2011 (African 
Alliance Securities 2010, 8). 
 
On the other side, investors looking for opportunities in Vietnam face a setback 
common to a majority of developing markets: information deficiency. In this case, 
there are several complications that make the problem even worse. First of all, 
Vietnam has a modified centrally planned economy unique to a handful of 
countries, thus it is difficult to apply the common knowledge of a market 
economy to such an environment. Moreover, Vietnamese stock exchanges, 
namely the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) and Hanoi Stock Exchange 
(HNX), are relatively new: the former was founded in 2000 and the latter in 2005 
(Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange 2011a). These facts undermine the abundance of 
information and academic literature which otherwise can serve as a basis for 
investing decisions. 
 
During his practical training period at Saigon Securities Incorporation, a 
prominent investment banking house in Vietnam, the author had the opportunity 
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to participate in various discussions with international financial institution experts 
regarding entry options to the Vietnam stock market. These conversations echoed 
the lack of information stated above. Discussion participants agreed that the topic 
of private companies offering their shares to the public, in an initial public 
offering is a fundamental one, yet there is almost no research on this issue in the 
Vietnamese environment at present. Given the rate at which private companies are 
going public on Vietnamese stock exchanges nowadays, IPOs are increasingly 
becoming lucrative investing options. Thus, the availability of such a study would 
be a valuable piece of knowledge in order to assist financial institutions and 
individual investors in the process of investing in Vietnam’s capital markets. 
Moreover, it will add to the scarce literature about this emerging market, and 
serve as a foundation for further research. 
1.2 Research objectives and questions 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the attractiveness of investing in initial 
public offerings in Vietnam. This purpose is expressed in the main research 
question: 
 
 Is it worthwhile for international financial institutions and individual 
investors to participate in initial public offerings in Vietnam? 
 
It is a well-known fact that when a private company first sells its shares to the 
public, such shares tend to be priced below their intrinsic value or be underpriced. 
This level of underpricing is evident when the stock is traded on a stock exchange 
for the first time, as the market will push the share price back to its real value, 
resulting in a large return for investors who purchased the offering shares. 
(Ibbotson, Sindelar & Ritter 1994, 67.) The return can be very substantial, just as 
in the case of Chinese IPOs in the period before 1995, whose share prices 
increased 948 percent on average after listing, or nine times the initial investment 
(Su & Fleisher 1999, 174). A more recent study in Bangladesh stock exchange 
puts the figure at 480 percent, almost five times the initial share price (Islam, Ali 
& Ahmad 2010, 36). Thus to examine the feasibility of IPOs as an investment 
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opportunity, it is necessary to find out the rate of return, or level of underpricing, 
and compare this rate with those of comparable markets. Accordingly, two sub-
questions have to be addressed: 
 
o What is the underpricing level of Vietnamese initial public 
offerings? 
 
o Does this underpricing level represent a substantial rate of return 
on investment in comparison with those of otherwise comparable 
markets? 
 
The second purpose of this study is to examine factors influencing the under 
pricing level in Vietnam. To date, various factors have been put forth to explain 
underpricing across markets, yet their significances vary under local conditions. 
The author anticipates that a discovery of such factors in the Vietnamese market 
will have a big impact on investing decisions, because those variables will help 
investors identify the most favorable initial public offering deals and consequently 
enhance profitability. This purpose is expressed in the second main research 
question: 
 
 What factors influence the level of underpricing of Vietnamese IPOs? 
 
Overall, these two research questions sum up the author’s intention and the 
objectives of this thesis. Subsequent parts of this chapter discuss the research 
method, the thesis’s scopes and limitations, as well as the thesis structure. 
1.3 Research method and data collection 
 
Research method is an important part of the thesis, in that it provides the means to 
justify the author’s choice of research conduct within a particular organization 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 25-26). Research method not only details precisely 
how research objectives will be met, but also rationalizes the choice of method in 
the light of those objectives. Breaking down into components, research method is 
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composed of: research design and choice of data collection. (Saunder, Lewis & 
Thornhill 2009, 43.) This section presents the author’s choice of research design 
as well as data gathering and provides justification for these selections. 
 
First of all, research approach is one of the two components of research design. It 
defines the link between literature review and empirical study, as well as the 
general course of a thesis. There are generally two choices: deductive approach 
and inductive approach. Deductive approach involves the development of a 
hypothesis from the theory before a research strategy is designed in order to test 
this hypothesis. In contrast, in inductive approach, data is collected and a theory is 
developed as a result of the data analysis. However, it is also possible for a 
combination approach that integrates elements of both deduction and induction. 
(Saunder et al. 2009, 124-127.) Overall, the exploratory nature of this study 
induces the author to choose deductive approach as the primary guideline. 
 
Next, research method is the other component of research design. Traditional 
research methods are often divided into two main types: quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Their differences lie in the manipulation of data collection 
technique and data analysis procedure. On one hand, the quantitative method 
predominantly uses data collection techniques, such as questionnaires, and data 
analysis procedures such as statistics that generates and uses numerical data. On 
the other hand, the qualitative method utilizes data collection techniques such as 
interviews and data analysis procedures such as categorizing data that uses and 
returns non-numerical data. (Saunder et al. 2009, 151.) While both methods are 
suitable for research and have been used extensively, their shortcomings have 
become more evident with the ever growing complexity of business issues. Driven 
by the need to study these complex issues, researchers more often than not find a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods desirable, for their natures 
are mutually complementary (Gorard & Taylor 2004, 3). Hence the use of both 
qualitative and quantitative approach in business research, or mixed method, is 
completely justified.  
 
As such, mixed method is deemed most suitable for the purpose of this study. Due 
to the nature of information necessitated to answer the main research questions, 
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the study utilizes a great deal of quantitative method. Nonetheless, the vast 
theoretical framework, as well as the lack of prior study in the Vietnamese 
environment means that the author must comply with some sorts of qualitative 
method to approach the conclusion. 
 
In addition, the collection of data also requires a systematic approach. Different 
data sources are utilized in this thesis, which are divided into theoretical and 
empirical parts. Necessary data for the theoretical part is collected mostly from 
books, reports and research articles that focus on IPOs and the aftermarket 
performance of IPO stocks. Next, the empirical part utilizes various financial 
databases to gather companies’ data which constitutes the main source for the 
analysis. Moreover, a large amount of primary data is collected from company 
prospectus, a legal document that has to be submitted to the exchange authorities 
prior to listing.  
 
Most importantly, the author has gathered invaluable insights from interviews 
with Mr. Pham Dinh Huy, Associate Director and Ms. Tran Mai Thuy, Analyst of 
Investment Banking Business, Saigon Securities Incorporation. Information was 
gathered using unstructured interviews, with each interview utilizes different 
themes and questions. The exploratory nature of this thesis induces the author to 
rely on unstructured interviews, which are deemed most suitable for this type of 
study (Saunders et al. 2009, 323). In summary, the following Figure 1 sums up the 
whole research methodology of this study: 
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FIGURE 1. Research methodology. 
1.4 Scope and limitations 
 
First, the chief concern of this study is to examine the IPO activities and the 
underpricing phenomenon in Vietnam. While the subject of IPOs is vast with 
many sub-disciplines, within the scope of this bachelor thesis the author elects to 
investigate only a narrow topic. This is done to preserve the consistency of the 
thesis and enhance knowledge of this particular topic, which can serve as a 
foundation for further research. 
 
Second, the study is written from an investor’s point of view and therefore 
financial institutions, such as investment and private banks, funds and venture 
capital funds, as well as private investors, will find the subject relevant and 
practical. Furthermore, this thesis also benefits companies looking for a joint 
venture, merger and acquisition, or simply long-term cooperation with 
Vietnamese enterprises with regard to allocating and preserving strategic capital 
resources. Although it is a narrow topic, the author believes its implications are 
far reaching and applicable to many business issues. 
 
Third, the author decides to investigate only companies that have been listed on 
one Vietnamese stock exchange, the HOSE. Although Vietnam has two official 
stock exchanges, namely HOSE and HNX, the author finds that the addition of 
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HNX in the study will only bring marginal benefit for several reasons. HOSE was 
created to serve national, well-established enterprises whilst HNX was created to 
serve smaller and younger local companies. Thus the size and scope of HNX are 
more of a national caliber, serving chiefly domestic investors. On the other hand, 
HOSE aims at both national and international investors, manifesting more 
stringent listing requirements and regulations. HNX lags behind HOSE in term of 
size, scope and liquidity, the last of which is of paramount importance to 
international investors. Hence the author finds it appropriate to exclude companies 
listed on HNX not only to give the thesis a more international orientation but also 
to maintain the integrity of the study.  
1.5 Thesis structure 
 
The thesis structure comprises of two parts: the theoretical framework and the 
empirical study. The following Figure 2 demonstrates briefly the structure of this 
thesis: 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Thesis structure. 
 
 
The study starts with the introduction in Chapter 1, where motives and objectives 
of the thesis are presented together with the utilized research methodology and 
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 8 
 
structure. Next, Chapter 2 and 3 encompass the theoretical framework. Chapter 2 
presents an overview on IPOs with regard to incentives, process and price setting 
mechanisms. Chapter 3 conveys general knowledge of underpricing in IPOs with 
regard to motivations for underpricing, its determinants as well as its importance 
in an emerging markets context. 
 
The empirical part is described in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis. Chapter 4 
presents the case study and discusses some unique features that will have an 
impact on the final result as well as investing options. Basing on the theoretical 
framework, in Chapter 5 the author uses data collected from financial sources to 
determine the level of underpricing in HOSE and places the result in comparison 
with that of other developing markets, in order to answer the first main question 
and its two sub-questions. In Chapter 6 various determinants of underpricing 
described in Chapter 3 are put into context within the Vietnam market, in order to 
examine their influence on the price behavior of IPOs.  
 
Chapter 7 draws on studies in the empirical part to answer both main questions. 
Moreover, implications of the result will be discussed to give recommendations to 
future investors as well as outline future research possibilities to further the cause 
of this study. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the whole thesis.  
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2 INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 
 
An initial public offering occurs when a private company sells its shares to the 
public for the first time. This is done with the assistance of an investment bank 
which markets the offering to investors in what is called the primary market. This 
primary market is strictly reserved for stocks that have never been issued before. 
Once investors have possession of said stocks, these stocks circulate on a 
secondary market, which is typically a national stock exchange. (Bodie, Kane & 
Marcus 2005, 66.)  
 
Although firms regularly raise capital by offering shares to public, an IPO is 
special in that it marks the firm’s transition from a private business to a public 
entity, a substantial change which transforms the whole ownership structure and 
every facet of the business. Indeed, IPO and “going public” are used 
interchangeably because of their close association. Moreover, an IPO is frequently 
the largest equity issue a corporation ever makes. (Zingales 1995, 425.) Once an 
IPO is done, a company cannot do another IPO; all subsequent public offerings 
are termed seasoned new issues, which require less stringent procedures and 
regulations than an IPO. Due to its strategic importance, every IPO requires 
careful research and involves various parties, who often work together for many 
years before the issue is through. (Geddes 2003, 1.) In order to equip the audience 
with a general knowledge of IPOs, this chapter provides an insight on a firm’s 
decision to do an IPO, advantages and disadvantages of doing an IPO, the offering 
process as well as criteria for a successful IPO. 
2.1 Reasons to go public 
 
There are numerous reasons for private firms to offer shares to outsiders and 
henceforth effectively transform themselves into public companies, though a 
majority of them do so for two reasons: 
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(1) Raising capital to further the cause of a company 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. Typical sources of new venture financing (Geddes et al. 2003, 8). 
 
 
During the life cycle of a business, a company will have access to several sources 
of financing. However, all options do not present at once but rather at various 
stages of the company’s development. As the company grows, its capital sources 
expand. Figure 3 describes typical capital sources for a growing business. A 
company in need of capital can attempt to take loans from financial institutions or 
seek venture financing, etc. However, raising capital by mean of a public offering 
carries a distinct advantage over debt: the company does not have to pay for 
interest incurred from loans. Instead, it may pay regular dividends for its new 
shareholders, an option that the firm can choose to exercise. Moreover, the 
incoming capital can be used to pay off debt, thereby solidifying the financial 
situation of the firm. An IPO is a desirable financing option for all these reasons. 
(Geddes et al. 2003, 8.) 
 
Nevertheless, opportunities for an IPO may appear only at a later stage of the 
business cycle, where the company is of a certain size and has some maturity. 
Investment has always been associated with risk, and inasmuch as an investor 
wants to profit, he/she wants to minimize risk as well. Apparently, the younger 
and less well-known the firm is, the higher the risk. (Bodie et al. 2005, 68.) 
Another facet of this pattern rests in the fact that most IPOs are priced below their 
potential value, also known as underpricing. This phenomenon will be described 
in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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(2) Raising funds for the existing shareholders 
 
More often than not, existing shareholders may wish to sell a part of their stake in 
the company. They might be professional investors, for example, who invested 
money in the firm in the past and want to cash in their investments to realize the 
profits (Brealey & Meyers 2003, 406). Venture capitalists and private equity 
providers are never long-term shareholders. Most have a target time horizon of 
three to seven years from the date of investment to the date of their departure. If 
stock markets are favorable, an IPO flotation may maximize their returns. 
(Geddes et al. 2003, 13.) 
 
In many cases, the founders are those who sell shares to the public. Although they 
have every right to do so, such offerings nonetheless generate a great deal of 
doubt from future buyers. The reason for this mistrust is because these insiders are 
usually regarded as the most knowledgeable persons about the performance of the 
offering firm and its future prospects. Thus when the founders want to part with 
their holdings, investors may suspect that this move indicates problems within the 
company. This is also the reason why every IPO requires a lockup period in which 
insiders are forbidden to sell their shares immediately after the completion of the 
offering. (Brav & Gompers 2003, 1.) 
 
Furthermore, a growing number of shareholder-led IPOs come from the part of 
government in the process of privatizing state-owned companies (SOEs). 
Although fundamentally identical to an IPO of a private business, political factors 
have greatly complicated the privatization of SOEs. Nevertheless, privatizations 
by way of share offerings have contributed to the development of equity markets 
in countries as diverse as Austria and Malaysia. (Gregoriou 2006, 191.) The case 
is especially imminent in China and Vietnam, where a majority of national 
enterprises are SOEs (Huy 2010). Whereas most of contemporary IPOs come 
from private firms, some of the largest IPOs ever are those from governments 
turning SOEs into public companies (Brealey et al. 2003, 406). 
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TABLE 1. Largest international IPOs to date (Renaissance Capital 2010). 
Company name Offer 
year 
Country 
of origin 
Deal size (US$ 
Millions) 
Pre-IPO state-
owned enterprise 
ABC Bank 2010 China $19 228 Yes 
ICBC Bank 2006 China $19 092 Yes 
NTT Mobile 1998 Japan $18 099  
Visa 2008 USA $17 864  
AIA 2010 HongKong $17 816  
ENEL Spa 1999 Italy $16 452 Yes 
General Motors 2010 USA $15 774  
Nippon Tel 1987 Japan $15 301 Yes 
Deutsche Telekom 1996 Germany $13 034 Yes 
Bank of China 2006 China $11 186 Yes 
 
 
Even though an IPO is beneficial for the initiator, it is not without disadvantages. 
The process of going public is a strategic one that will affect the business in the 
long term. As such, companies must recognize and weigh potential risks.  
2.2 Advantages and disadvantages of doing an initial public offering 
2.2.1 Advantages 
 
Liquidity and increased share price 
 
Companies listed on a stock exchange are typically worth more than similar 
companies that are privately held. The obligation of a public company to disclose 
its operational information as required by law reduces uncertainty and thereby 
increases the company’s value. Moreover, share listing facilitates trading and 
brings liquidity to the market so that investors can trade in the stocks at will. This 
alone is worth a premium, as private companies’ stocks have little to no liquidity. 
On average, the listed company will be worth approximately 30 percent more than 
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the private company, even if they are identical in all other aspects. (Geddes et al. 
2003, 24.) 
 
Management and employee motivation 
 
The use of stock options and stock bonuses as a reward is popular among public 
companies. Although private firms can and have been issuing stocks to employees 
as bonuses, the practice is more widespread in public corporations, mainly 
because of the limited liquidity of private companies’ stocks. These incentives are 
convenient for two reasons: deferring operational expenses and facilitating long-
term relationship with employees. Furthermore, since employees have more 
motivation to work, their efforts will be reflected in share prices. (Chemmanur & 
Fulghieri 1999, 251.) 
 
Enhanced image 
 
Public companies are required by stock exchange authorities and securities 
commissions to disclose information on a regular basis. This continuous 
disclosure maintains and enhances the company’s prestige in the public. 
Moreover, company’s image also benefits the employees due to a considerable 
prestige attached to managing and working for a publicly listed company. This 
can lead to the recruitment and retention of higher quality employees. A listing 
may also bring marketing benefits by making the company stronger and more 
substantial. Accordingly, press coverage of public companies is typically greater 
than that of private-owned firms. (Geddes et al. 2003, 251.) 
 
Access to alternative sources of capital 
 
Alternative sources of capital are more accessible to a firm when it becomes a 
public company. Therefore, listed companies are often able to raise money more 
easily and quickly than do private companies of similar size. Since the main 
reason to initiate an IPO is to raise capital, such an offering generally improves a 
company’s debt-to-equity ratio so that the company may be able to borrow on 
better terms in the future. (Geddes et al. 2003, 25.) 
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2.2.2 Disadvantages 
 
Increased disclosure 
 
One of the main disadvantages in doing an IPO is the obligation to disclose more 
information to the public. Since the information is available to everybody, the 
number of people who has access to the company’s financial records increases 
significantly. Prior to doing an IPO, a company has to release a substantial 
amount of information about the offering in the prospectus to inform investors of 
its prospects. In addition, companies are required by the stock exchange, on which 
the company’s stocks are listed and the securities commissions to disclose 
information on a regular basis so as to investors can decide their action towards 
the stocks: buy, sell or hold. (Spindler 2010, 5.) 
 
Costs of IPOs 
 
An IPO often carries substantial expenses because of its complexity. For example, 
the underwriters’ commissions are about seven percent of the total value of the 
IPO. There is also a considerable cost of other activities such as public relations, 
printing, marketing and consultancy. In addition to the costs of the IPO, when the 
firm’s stocks are listed on a stock exchange there are also many costs to maintain 
the firm’s compliance with the exchange’s regulations. (Chen & Ritter 2000, 
1105-1106.) 
 
Separation of ownership and control 
 
A certain consequence of doing an IPO is the dilution of ownership control for 
existing shareholders. Prior to an IPO, the owners and the managers are often the 
same persons. At the end of the IPO, the number of shareholders usually 
increases. This increase in ownership pool means that the original shareholders 
have to share voting power with new shareholders, and thereby reduce the 
former’s ability to control the company. Moreover, public companies have a 
higher tendency to hire professionals for the management team. This separation of 
ownership and control has a potential problem: hired managers are suspected of 
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working for their best interest since they have no ownership of the company. In 
order to ensure that the managers work in the best interest of the shareholders, 
public companies have board of directors to inspect managers’ actions on behalf 
of the shareholders. (Geddes et al. 2003, 28; Pham, Kalev & Steen 2003, 920.) 
2.3 Initial public offering process 
 
An IPO is an expensive and arduous process, requiring a significant time 
commitment from the company’s boards and the investment bank advising the 
IPO. The ultimate goal of an IPO encompasses achieving several parties’ 
objectives which requires careful calculation and compromise. Moreover, the IPO 
process heavily depends on respective laws and regulations pertaining to 
particular countries. Even so, there are some commonalities among IPOs around 
the world. (Geddes et al. 2003, 4.) As a result, a general knowledge about these 
commonalities is essential not only to understand the whole process, but also to 
distinguish unique features when it comes to a distinct country. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4. IPO process (Geddes et al. 2003, 44). 
 
 
In this subchapter, common components of the IPO process are discussed. These 
components include corporate issues, offering structure, regulations and 
documentation, marketing, stock pricing, stock allocation and aftermarket issues. 
Corporate 
issues
Offering 
structure
Regulations 
and 
documentation
Marketing, 
pricing and 
allocation
Aftermarket
 16 
 
2.3.1 Corporate issues 
 
When issuing an IPO, a firm’s management and shareholders need to find out how 
to get the company in condition for the public markets. Usually, companies 
require a good deal of corporate housekeeping before they can go public. First and 
foremost, corporate structure and organizational issues need to meet the 
requirement for a public company. Determining the corporate structure is 
straightforward in most cases, with the exception of privatizations, which have 
always been more conservative in organizational structure than their private 
counterparts. Thereafter, determining membership of the board of directors has to 
be done. It is important to include several independent directors and preferably 
ensure that non-executive directors are in the majority. It is useful to have 
independent directors who have been directors or senior officers of other public 
companies and who are known to be the main institutional investors. In addition, 
some offerings, particularly those of large privatizations, include a separate 
tranche of shares offered to the company’s employees. In other offerings, 
employees place orders for shares like any retail investors, but receive a 
preferential allocation. Furthermore, the shares are usually priced at a discount to 
the price paid by investors. (Geddes et al. 2003, 47.) 
2.3.2 Offering structure 
 
Next, the company has to decide when to sell its shares and on which stock 
exchange to list the newly issued stocks upon completion of the IPO. For 
example, a large, well-established and profitable company is most suitable to be 
listed on its home country’s main stock exchange and preferably sells shares to 
domestic investors. If it is very large, underwriters may recommend selling 
additional shares to international investors. On the contrary, young and small 
companies tend to list on their home country’s second market, which has been 
specially developed for such companies. In either case, the company will be 
subject to its home jurisdiction’s rules and regulations, which are administered by 
local securities regulators. (Geddes et al. 2003, 49.) 
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2.3.3 Regulation and documentation 
 
Individual exchanges have distinct regulations and documentation requirements. 
Thus, these issues can only be handled after the company makes a decision on 
offering structure, which determines investor’s demographic and a specific stock 
exchange to list on. Subsequently, the IPO issuer and its underwriters must begin 
to prepare the documentation that will be required to be produced, both for 
potential investors and for regulators. The main documents are registration 
statements and a prospectus which contains all the financial and non-financial 
information that potential investors require in order to make the investment 
decision. In most countries, the local securities regulators have to approve the 
contents of the prospectus before it can be distributed to potential buyers. (Bodie 
et al., 66.) 
 
The prospectus holds a special place in the whole documentation process, 
especially since it has to fill two roles. First, it is a legal requirement that binds the 
offering parties with legal liabilities. Second, it is the only paper that will be 
distributed to investors, and therefore the only chance for the issuer to persuade 
potential customers. A prospectus containing comprehensive information about 
the offering company can help reduce the risk of liability for misleading future 
buyers. However, it is difficult to balance the two purposes. If there is too much 
marketing, the prospectus may not provide sufficient disclosure, whereas too 
much legal information may defeat the paper’s selling effort. Usually, a 
distributable prospectus has to convey information concisely and precisely about 
the issuer’s business, details of the offered shares and a summary of financial 
data. (Geddes el al. 2003, 54.)  
 
Although the required content may vary, today many prospectuses have adapted 
the international disclosure standard from the International Organization of 
Securities Commission (IOSCO). Indeed, the disclosure standard of the 
Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN), which includes Vietnam, was 
built upon the IOSCO standard (ACMF's ASEAN and Plus Standards 2011). 
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TABLE 2. International Organization of Securities Commission’s prospectus 
content standard (IOSCO 2011). 
Category Criteria 
Identity of directors, 
senior management, 
and advisors 
Directors and senior management 
Advisors 
Auditors 
 
Offer statistics and ex-
pected timetable 
 
Offer statistics 
Expected timetable 
Key information Selected financial data 
Capitalization and indebtedness  
Reasons for the offer and use of proceeds  
Risk factors 
Information on compa-
ny 
 
History and development of the company  
Business overview  
Organizational structure  
Property, plant, and equipment 
 
Operating and financial 
review and prospects 
Operating results  
Liquidity and capital resources  
Research and development, patents, licenses 
Future prospect information 
Directors, senior man-
agement, and employees 
Directors and senior management  
Compensation  
Board practices  
Employees  
Share ownership 
 
Major shareholders and 
related party transac-
tions 
Major shareholders  
Related party transactions  
Interest of experts and counsel 
 
Financial information Consolidated statements and other financial 
information  
Significant changes 
 
The offer and listing Offer and listing details  
Distribution plan 
Markets  
Selling shareholders  
Dilution  
Expenses of the issue 
 
Additional information Share capital  
Memorandum and articles of association  
Material contracts  
Exchange controls  
Taxation  
Dividends and paying agents  
Statement by experts  
Documents on display  
Subsidiary information 
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Furthermore, the managers of the offering have a separate responsibility to make a 
reasonable investigation to ensure the accuracy of the offering documents. In the 
process, information is gathered in order to produce a marketing plan. Plus, this 
investigation is also a disclosure document that provides full disclosure. The 
gathered formation will reduce liability for potential risks. Specifically, Geddes et 
al. (2003, 108) lists some of the risks mitigated by this investigation from a 
marketing perspective: 
 
 Inadequate/inaccurate disclosure; 
 Pricing not reflecting risk; 
 Ill-informed decision making by investors; 
 Undermining the reputation of the issuer and investment banks involved. 
2.3.4 Marketing 
 
Once authorities have approved all required documents, the company and its 
advisors start preparing for marketing and distributing the shares. Depending on 
the size and complexity of an offering, this marketing period can last up to four 
months and even longer. In some privatizations, the marketing campaign begins 
more than a year before the launch of the offering. The purpose of this marketing 
period is to raise investors’ awareness about the deal, so that they are already 
familiar with the company once the IPO commences. In addition, companies 
planning for IPOs may also increase or begin corporate advertising, aimed at 
either financial institutions or individual investors. This decision depends on who 
is expected to provide the strongest demand for the offering. Most companies who 
initiate their IPOs as part of the privatization process start retail-oriented 
information advertising campaign months before they start advertising the 
offering. (Geddes et al. 2003, 56.) 
 
Generally, there are two marketing phases associated with an IPO. In the pre-
marketing period, the issuers devote large efforts to make investors familiar with 
the offering company. This period is often the most variable in length and depends 
largely on the degree of public exposure of the firm. This phase is often 
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commenced before or in parallel with the documentation process, preceding the 
publication of the prospectus. The most important result of this period is to screen 
public interest and evaluate market conditions, as well as to provide an acceptable 
price range for the IPO. If the issuers find unfavorable conclusions in the pre-
marketing period, they may cancel the offering entirely. When the final 
prospectus is approved, the formal marketing period begins. The issuers will start 
to distribute the approved prospectus and arrange road shows, where company’s 
executives give presentations to interested parties. These road shows give 
investors opportunities to interact with insiders in the company and ask question 
regarding the upcoming offering. On the company side, these presentations help 
generate greater public interest and gauge the future results. This period is 
intended to intensify public interest generated in the pre-marketing effort, and 
convert the interest into orders. As the final offering price will be available at the 
end of the marketing phase, the success of an IPO depends largely on the 
performance of the offering team in the marketing period. (Bodie et al. 2005, 68.) 
2.3.5 Pricing and allocation 
 
Price evaluation and stock allocation are the most important parts of an IPO 
process. Investment banks that specialize in IPO business generally use one of 
three methods to determine the price of stock: bookbuilding, fixed price offer or 
stock auction. When the price is available, the shares will be distributed to 
registered buyers. More often than not, investors’ demand will exceed the number 
of stocks available for sale. In that case, issuers must decide how to distribute 
stock equitably. (Geddes et al. 2003, 58.) 
 
Nowadays, bookbuilding is the most popular method, followed by fixed price 
offerings. Stock auctions were popular in the past, especially in Japan, France and 
Belgium, but have been increasingly obsolete ever since. (Geddes et al. 2003, 66.) 
Nevertheless, the dominant price setting mechanism in Vietnam’s primary market 
is the stock auction (Huy 2010). 
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Bookbuilding 
 
In the bookbuilding method, the investment bank advises the company to set a 
possible price range for its upcoming IPO and then uses the proposed price range 
to examine investors’ interest with a formal bookbuilding campaign. The issuers 
use this period to canvass investors’ opinions in both the price and the quantity of 
shares they are willing to purchase. These opinions are collected in a “book”, 
giving the company a clear picture of demand at different price levels. At the end 
of this bookbuilding period, the company and its investment bank will decide on 
the final price and offering quantity based on gathered information during the 
bookbuilding period. All investors are entitled to buy shares at this price. Usually, 
the investment bank who is responsible for this IPO will underwrite the deal at 
this stage. As such, it guarantees the proceeds of the company’s IPO offering, and 
will buy all the unsold shares at the final price. Today, most large international 
equity offerings are run as bookbuilding exercises, regardless of the issuers’ 
traditional domestic market practices. (Geddes et al. 2003, 70.)  
 
The IPO of industry giant Neste Oil on Helsinki Stock Exchange in 2005 is a 
prime example of IPO using bookbuilding method. Prior to the IPO, Neste’s 
issuers established a price range of EUR 13 – EUR 15 per share and canvassed 
investors’ interest during the bookbuilding period. At the end of this period, the 
final price was decided, which was EUR 15 and thus gave Neste an initial market 
capitalization of EUR 3.9 billion. (Neste 2011.) 
 
Fixed price 
 
In the fixed price mechanism, the price and number of shares offered are fixed 
before the IPO is announced. There are two types of fixed price offers: 
underwritten and best efforts. In the underwritten fixed price offer, the issuers 
canvass investors’ opinion in a less formal manner than in the bookbuilding offer. 
The investigation period is not announced, and there is no specific time frame for 
this activity. Using the information gathered, the issuer and its banks decide on an 
offering price. When the price is set, the bank underwrites the offer, guaranteeing 
that the company will receive the desired amount of capital that it expects from 
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the IPO. Hence, the underwriters will buy any unsold stocks at a specified price in 
compliance with their underwriting commitment. Generally, an underwritten fixed 
price offer is considered riskier than an underwritten bookbuilding for the 
investment bank who facilitates the deal. Unlike the bookbuilding IPO, in the 
fixed price IPO the underwriters do not know in advance the demand for the IPO. 
Whereas, in the bookbuilding offering, the investment banks only underwrite the 
IPO once they know there is sufficient demand for the offer. (Geddes et al. 2003, 
69.) 
 
In the best effort fixed price offering, the investment banks advising the deal 
guarantee that they will try “their best” to sell the IPO stocks. The price is set in 
the same manner as in the underwritten fixed price offer, but follows by a 
minimum and sometimes maximum offering size set. Investors are invited to 
subscribe for the IPO’s stocks in a limited period. If there are insufficient orders 
to reach the minimum size, the offering will be abandoned. If there is a heavy 
demand and the maximum offering size is attained, the subscription period will be 
followed by stock allocation. Practically, best efforts deals tend to be done for 
smaller enterprises. Finally, investors in best efforts offerings tend to be 
individuals, not institutions. (Geddes et al. 2003, 69.) 
 
Auction 
 
If an IPO uses the auction mechanism, the issuers allow investors to submit bids 
for the number of shares they want at a particular price. Moreover, the issuers will 
specify a minimum price and only allow investors to bid for shares at or above 
that minimum. In some auctions, participating investors are allowed to make only 
one bid at one price. On the contrary, in other auctions, investors can place 
multiple bids at different prices, thus increasing their chances and diversifying the 
demand. Even so, both types of auction have a final offering price from which 
there are sufficient orders to cover the number of shares in the offering. All 
investors are charged the final offering price for their shares, even if they were 
willing to pay a higher price. By naming their own price, investors preempt much 
of the first-day volatility that occurs when some investors flip their stocks to 
others who desperately want to get a share from the IPO. As such, auction method 
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usually results in a low underpricing level, which brings a low initial return. 
(Geddes et al. 2003, 66.) One notable example is the Japanese market between 
1993 and 2001. Between 1993 and 1997, 481 auctioned IPOs registered an 
average one day gain of 11.4 percent. From 1997 to 2001, there were 469 IPOs 
whose price setting mechanism is bookbuilding. The average first-day return of 
these IPOs jumped to 48 percent. (Kaneko & Pettway 2003, 459.) 
 
An auction can be beneficial for the issuers: generally it incurs lower commissions 
and it should be able to maximize proceeds. However, a potential lack of 
aftermarket demand can cause the shares offered in this manner to languish in the 
stock market, which might not bode well for any future offerings of the company. 
Nowadays, auctions are the least common form of price setting, although they 
continue to be used occasionally in some markets. The auction process has 
traditionally accounted for a large portion of French domestic offerings. Other 
markets in which auctions have accounted for a significant proportion of IPOs 
include Belgium, Chile, Japan and Portugal. (Geddes et al. 2003, 66.) 
2.3.6 Aftermarket 
 
The period immediately after the allocation and listing of the stocks is critical. If a 
company’s stocks do not generate a high demand, their price may decline on the 
stock exchange. Consequently, a company that requires further equity financing 
will find it difficult to make subsequent offerings. In order to avoid this shortfall, 
an IPO is often priced below its real value so that when the stocks are first traded 
on the market their price will increase, providing a good initial return for buyers 
and thus guaranteeing their orders for the next capital offering. (Brealey et al. 
2003, 411.) 
Besides, all companies who have listed their stocks on the stock exchanges are 
required to regularly disclose company information. At a minimum, this 
disclosure includes an interim and annual report, as well as announcements to the 
market whenever anything happens that may have an impact on the share price. 
The disclosure obligation can prove an obstacle for a newly transformed public 
company, which faced little public scrutiny and reporting standards when it was 
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still a private enterprise. Nevertheless, tightening regulations resulting from 
financial frauds in recent years mean that any mishap will be closely examined 
and at worst the stocks will be denied from circulation by the listing exchange. 
(Geddes et al. 2003, 208.) 
 
Additionally, existing shareholders of IPO companies are subject to a lockup 
period that typically lasts for six months, in which they are forbidden to sell any 
of their shares. Information about the lockup agreement, including time span, 
number of shares and the involved persons, is detailed in the prospectus, and is 
approved before the offering is finalized. This procedure is to prevent any 
shareholder from dumping his/her holdings on the market, especially venture 
capitalists that do not follow a holding strategy for public stocks. Moreover, the 
move provides a signal of commitment and quality of the IPO, evading suspicion 
on the intention of the selling parties and confirming insiders’ ties with the 
company. (Brav et al. 2003, 1.) 
2.4 Criteria for a successful initial public offering 
 
In an IPO, participating parties have different expectations. The company 
initiating an IPO wants to maximize the proceeds from the offering and have a 
stable ownership base once the IPO is completed. On the other hand, investors 
expect a sizable profit from the acquired shares. As the intermediary, the 
investment bank wants to satisfy both the company and the investors, and expects 
its association with a successful deal will bring more business. (Geddes et al. 
2003, 30.) 
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FIGURE 5. Objectives of companies, investors and underwriters in an IPO 
(Geddes et al. et al. 2003, 2). 
 
 
An IPO is considered successful when it meets the expectations of the issuing 
company, the investors and to a lesser degree the underwriter (Geddes et al. 2003, 
30). Although these parties’ expectations are not similar, there are some 
commonalities: 
 
 All parties expect a reasonable increase in stock price on the first trading 
day. This increase should be high enough to keep investors happy, but not 
too high so as to induce the issuer that it has left too much money in the 
process. Moreover, such premium warrants that subsequent offerings from 
the company are welcomed. Additionally, underwriters acquire a boost to 
their reputations from participating in a successful deal. (Geddes et al. 
2003, 30.) 
 
 A broad and balanced distribution of stocks is desirable for the stability of 
the company and the liquidity of stocks. A balanced presence of 
institutional investors and individual shareholders, as well as short-term 
and long-term investors is desirable. This structure gives the firm a stable 
Company
• Maximize proceeds
• Keep investors happy with 
immediate share price increase
• Broad and stable ownership base
• Facilitate future financings
Vendor
• Maximize proceeds
• Maximize value of 
remaining shares
• Involve in successful deal
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• Maximize share price 
performance
• Acquire shares in 
attractive  company
• Broaden investment 
portfolio
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ownership structure while still ensuring stock liquidity on the market. 
(Geddes et al. 2003, 30.) 
 
One of the two common expectations of all parties in an IPO is a reasonable 
increase in stock’s price on the first trading day. This expectation is a prelude for 
underpricing phenomenon, which will be described in more details in Chapter 3. 
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3 UNDERPRICING PHENOMENON 
 
The most notable feature of an IPO is perhaps the large initial return, 
characterizing by a remarkable increase in price between the offering price and 
the market price at the end of the first trading day on stock market (Ibbotson et al. 
1994, 67). Indeed, this anomaly has been observed in most stock markets in both 
developed and emerging countries, albeit in different scales (Loughran, Ritter & 
Rydqvist 2010). More importantly, this anomaly demonstrates that IPO stocks are 
commonly underpriced compared to where they could have been marketed. The 
underpricing depicts a serious problem: had IPO stocks been priced higher, 
companies would have received more capital. One can say that the IPO process is 
inefficient and there is “money left on the table”. In a sense, the untapped money 
should be regarded as another cost of the issue. Yet underpricing occurs 
consistently whenever an IPO is documented. (Geddes et al. 2003, 27.) As a 
result, it has attracted a great deal of attention and spawned an extensive literature, 
which attempts to explain this eminent financial oddity. 
3.1 Reasons for new issue underpricing 
 
Over the years, several reasons have been put forth to demystify this large initial 
return. Ritter (1998, 7) proposes seven hypotheses as possible causes: winner’s 
curse hypothesis, market feedback hypothesis, bandwagon hypothesis, investment 
banker’s monopsony power hypothesis, lawsuit avoidance hypothesis, signaling 
theory and ownership dispersion hypothesis.  
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FIGURE 6. Reasons to underprice new issue (Ritter et al. 1998, 7). 
 
 
Furthermore, these hypotheses fall into two categories, depending on whether 
asymmetric information or symmetric information is assumed. Asymmetric 
information refers to situations in which not all information is available for 
everyone, accordingly there are investors who know better than others, and vice 
versa. On the contrary, advocates for symmetric information believe that all 
information surrounding an IPO is readily available for all interested parties. 
(Ritter & Welch 2002, 1803.)  
3.1.1 Asymmetric information 
 
Winner’s curse hypothesis 
 
Asymmetric information proponents argue that there is a great deal of uncertainty 
surrounding an IPO due to information scarcity at the time of the offering. 
Consequently, it is difficult to identify the true value of the tender. The situation 
creates two classes of investors: those who have superior access to information, 
and those who have limited information resources. Evidently, informed investors 
are in a better position to concentrate on underpriced IPOs and reject overpriced 
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IPOs. On the contrary, uninformed investors cannot allocate their resources as 
efficiently as their counterparts, putting them at a disadvantage. Nevertheless, the 
uninformed crowd naturally constitutes the majority of potential buyers. 
Accordingly, uninformed investors face a dilemma: they could get all the shares 
they asked for only if the informed investors did not want the shares. This forms 
the winner’s curse hypothesis. (Brealey et al. 2003, 412.) As a result, the presence 
of underpricing is deliberately created to provide a rationale for uninformed 
investors to overcome this information bias (Rock 1986, 190-191). However, 
Habib & Ljungqvist (1998, 383) provide evidences that underpricing will 
decrease IPO proceeds even in the absence of any change in uncertainty, 
suggesting that the documented positive relationship between underpricing and 
risk consideration is dubious. 
 
Nevertheless, this perspective has gained mainstream recognition with the support 
of further evidence, such as the researches of Allen & Faulhaber (1989, 318) and 
Ibbotson et al. (1994, 70). Recently, studies have found the connection between 
the winner’s curse hypothesis and underpricing in some Asian markets to be 
significant. For example, this theory supports the explanation for underpricing of 
a sample of 562 Chinese IPOs between 1996-2001 (Coakley, Instefjord & Shen 
2007, 19). Similar results are documented in Malaysian markets (Yong 2009, 27) 
and Singaporean markets (Jagannathan & Sherman 2006, 23). 
 
Market feedback hypothesis 
 
Market feedback hypothesis assumes that a proportion of investors are better 
informed than the underwriters. Under this assumption, the underwriters 
underprice the IPOs to induce investors to reveal information, which can then be 
used to evaluate share price during the bookbuilding process. In this sense, the 
underwriters compensate investors through underpricing for revealing the 
investors’ valuations of the upcoming offering. However, one complication of the 
market feedback hypothesis is that investors have little incentive to reveal 
valuable information, which may lead to an increase in the final offering price and 
therefore hurt their profit. Hence the centerpiece of this hypothesis relies on the 
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ability of the underwriters to show buyers that it is in their best interest to reveal 
information truthfully. (Ritter et al. 2002, 1805.) 
 
Bandwagon effect hypothesis 
 
In an IPO, the bandwagon effect hypothesis argues that potential investors pay 
attention not only to their own information but also to the actions of other 
investors. If an investor observes that nobody wants to buy shares of a particular 
IPO, he or she may decide not to buy even when there is favorable information. 
To prevent this from happening, the issuer deliberately underprices an issue to 
attract the first few potential buyers and therefore bring about a bandwagon, in 
which subsequent buyers will want to participate regardless of their own 
information concerning the issue. (Ritter et al. 1998, 9.) 
 
Underwriter’s monopsony power hypothesis 
 
Underwriters who hold considerable power in deciding the offering price can take 
advantage of their position to underprice the issue so that they are able to spend 
less marketing effort and favor themselves with investors. This conflict of interest 
is well-known and has made spotlight quite a few times. For example, part of the 
Wall Street scandals of 2000-2002 centered on the allocation of shares in IPOs, in 
which underwriters gave generous IPO allocation to executives of particular firms 
in return for the firm’s future issuing business. (Bodie et al. 2005, 70.) While the 
practice is still common, tightening regulations and supervision have lowered its 
incidences and level. Nevertheless, in less sophisticated markets whose 
regulations are lax, such as emerging markets, there is no guarantee of the 
limitation of this practice (Huy 2010). 
 
Signaling theory 
 
Signaling theory constitutes an important explanation for the occurrence of 
underpriced shares. Under signaling theory, the company sacrifices part of the 
gain from IPO hoping that investors will return to purchase more in subsequent 
offerings. As stated in Chapter 2, an IPO is considered successful when it meets 
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the expectation of all participating parties: the company, the underwriter and the 
investors. When conflicts of interest arise, compromises must be made. According 
to Geddes et al. (2003, 5), the signaling theory is one such compromise. A 
company is willing to accept “money left on the table” in order to keep investors 
happy as they reap immediate profit from the surge in stock’s price upon listing. 
In return, the company hopes to build long term relationship with investors and 
makes future offerings more attractive to them. This theory has been proved to be 
credible as underpricing can signal favorable prospects for the firm (Allen et al. 
1989, 319). 
3.1.2 Symmetric information 
 
 
Lawsuit avoidance 
 
Tinic (1988, 800) finds that underpricing can be possibly used as a hedge against 
future lawsuit from disappointed new shareholders. Indeed, since private 
companies do not disclose their information to the public, necessary knowledge to 
grade an upcoming IPO is scarce for investors. Hence investors have to rely on 
information from the underwriters about the company to conduct their research. 
Furthermore, both the company and the underwriters are held liable for this 
information as required by law. The disclosure, while accurate at the time of 
composition, cannot include all data nor account for changes in management and 
financial position during the IPO process. Thus the company and the underwriters 
are exposed to possible lawsuit threats, regardless of their intentions. In order to 
avoid that possibility, the issuing parties intentionally lower the share prices to 
keep investors happy, thus lower the risk of lawsuit. (Hughes & Thakor 1992, 
737.) However, Ritter et al. (1998, 9) argues that the hypothesis is not credible, 
reasoning that in countries where such lawsuit actions are unknown , such as 
Finland, the level of underpricing is just as much as in countries familiar with 
those actions. 
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Ownership dispersion 
 
The issuing company may use underpricing as a tool to control its ownership 
structure. As such it will deliberately underprice its shares to generate excess 
demand so that there will be a large number of small shareholders, each having 
insignificant voting power. The intention is twofold: for one, a dispersed 
ownership will increase the company’s stock liquidity on the market, as small 
shareholders are more likely than big shareholder to sell stocks for profit, instead 
of retaining them for voting rights. On the other hand, this ownership structure 
makes it more difficult to challenge the board of management. (Ritter et al. 1998, 
10; Pagano & Roell 1998, 215.) 
3.2 Factors influencing underpricing level of initial public offerings 
3.2.1 Offering size 
 
Ritter (1984, 1236) finds that not only do initial returns on IPOs correlate with the 
size of the offerings, but that these two variables also negatively affect each other. 
Overall, evidence suggests that a smaller IPO is riskier than a larger IPO, with all 
other things being equal. Therefore, a smaller IPO is underpriced more often than 
a larger IPO to induce investors into taking a higher risk (Ritter et al. 1984, 1236). 
This explanation lends credibility to the winner’s curse hypothesis in the previous 
part, which dictates that issuers reward uninformed investors for participating in 
risky IPOs to offset potential loss due to information asymmetry. 
 
Later research by Megginson & Weiss (1990, 898) proves the pattern to be 
consistent. However, they comment that the significance of offering size depends 
on whether other variables are taken into account. According to their research, the 
age of a company has more weight in determining the underpricing level. 
 
Nevertheless, recent studies in developing markets encourage the eligibility of 
offering size as a predictor of the degree of underpricing. A study of IPOs in 
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Chinese markets by Su et al. (1999, 185) reveals that with every one percent 
decrease in the size of an IPO, there is a one percent decrease in the share price. 
On the other hand, a one percent increase in the IPO size leads to approximately 
0.52 percent decline in the IPO return. Another research on the Indian exchange in 
the periods of 1992-1995 and 1999-2003 reveals that on average the size of the 
issue reduces underpricing by 75 percent (Ranjan & Madhusoodanan 2004, 19). 
Last but not least, the IPOs on Chittagong Stock Exchange of Bangladesh, a 
comparable emerging market with Vietnam, have been influenced significantly by 
offering size (Islam et al. 2010, 41).  
3.2.2 Age of the firm 
 
How long a company has been established prior to its IPO has a positive impact 
on initial share price. Investors perceive a young company as a higher risk than an 
established company with a proven track record. Therefore, buyers require a 
higher return to offset the uncertainty risk of the younger firm. This requirement 
transforms into a higher level of underpricing, or lower share price, which the 
firm more or less is advised to do. (Ljungqvist 2006, 60.) 
 
A company’s age prior to the IPO is widely regarded as a main determinant on the 
post market performance of its shares. In fact, many empirical studies on 
underpricing have used this factor to explain the initial stock performance across 
countries. Clark (2002, 399) sampled a list of 1234 IPOs in the United States 
between 1991 and 1997 and found a statistically significant correlation between 
firm age at IPO and post IPO excess returns. In Asian markets, the result is 
restated in a study of Japanese IPOs (Kaneko et al. 2003, 459). 
 
Perhaps the most relevant study about this factor is by Uddin (2008, 71) who 
examined determinants of underpricing in the Singapore and Malaysia stock 
exchanges using a fairly large sample of 861 IPOs from 1990 to 2000. The result 
shows a mixed conclusion. While Malaysian IPOs significantly affected by how 
old the firms are, this factor is insignificant in determining Singaporean IPOs’ 
underpricing. However, age of the firm proves influential in the combined sample, 
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which suggests that the Singaporean IPOs result is somewhat questionable. On the 
other hand, a company’s age is insignificant as a variable for IPOs return in 
another South East Asian country: Thailand (Chiraphadhanakul & Gunawardana 
2005, 6).  
3.2.3 Size of the firm 
 
Based on empirical research, Dalton, Certo & Daily (2003, 299) confirms that a 
company’s size also influences underpricing. They explain that since larger firms 
are perceived as more stable, this characteristic reduces the amount of risk 
investors are exposed to. This phenomenon is in accordance with the above 
mentioned winner’s curse hypothesis, which associates lower underpricing with 
lower exposed risk. This is a follow up of the study of Buckland & Davis (1990, 
219), which indicates that United Kingdom IPOs are largely influenced by a 
firm’s size, regardless of other variables. 
 
Comparable markets in Asia have shown that this variable accounts for how much 
stocks are underpriced. For example, evidence is found in Thailand’s stock 
exchanges (Chiraphadhanakul et al. 2005, 4), Malaysia’s stock exchanges 
(Annuar 1998, 77), as well as Bangladesh’s stock exchange (Islam et al. 2010, 
41). As a result of these findings, size of the firm is credible as a determinant of 
IPO stock price, especially for similar markets in the same region. 
3.2.4 Time lag between offering and listing dates 
 
Recent evidence proves that there is a correlation between underpricing and the 
length of time from offering date to listing date. This correlation is described in 
the study of Derrien & Kecskes (2007) about United Kingdom IPOs, in which 
they argue that the time lag between the two events lowers the incidence of 
underpricing. As such, the longer the waiting period to listing date, the lower the 
initial increase in stock price at the first trading day. The provided explanation 
stipulates that since much information has been released in the intermediate 
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period between the IPOs and the listing, the market absorbs this information and 
thereby reduce the risk associated with these IPOs. As risk is mitigated, investors 
find little incentive to demand a higher compensation and thus are more willing to 
accept a lower initial return.  
 
In Asia, the eminence of this factor has been documented in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, where the time lag was significant in the period 1990-1993 (Mok & 
Hui 1998, 460). More recently, Yu & Tse (2006, 377) reexamine this factor, using 
more recent data from the IPOs in 1995-1998 and find an unimportant relation 
between time lag and underpricing. They attribute this finding to the dramatically 
shortened time between offering and listing. Although their study runs contrarily 
to previous finding, its implication strengthens the importance of time lag as a 
determinant. 
3.2.5 Industry composition 
 
It has long been known that people ascribe industry sectors with different values. 
For example, the financial sector has always been held with prestige and high 
value, while the agricultural sector is perceived as low value and dated. It has 
nothing to do with individual companies, as investigation will show a coffee 
company generates more revenue and profit than an auditing service just as often 
as people perceive oppositely. Investors are just normal people, and more often 
than not are subjected to prejudice. Indeed, industry preference is widespread 
among investors across countries, and researches show that underpricing is tied 
with industrial sectors (Islam et al. 2010, 41). 
 
On the other hand, firms have an advantage to list on stock exchange where there 
are already a number of listed firms in the same industry. It is because those 
preceding firms provided information in their prospectus, in which more or less 
information about the industry was included. Such information provides an insight 
on the prospect of the firm as well as the industry as a whole, thereby reducing 
uncertainty on the future of the industry. This fact benefits upcoming firms in the 
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same industry, as the increased transparency reduces the likelihood that the issuers 
have to underprice shares to attract investors. (Mauer & Senbet 1992, 76.) 
In addition, industry composition is also significant in that it determines the 
weight of other variables. In Chiraphadhanakul et al. (2005, 4) study, they find 
that firm’s size is relevant to financial companies’ IPOs, yet it poses no 
relationship with initial return of food industry’s IPOs. Likewise, the result is 
repeated in construction material sector and technological sector 
(Chiraphadhanakul et al. 2005, 5). 
3.3 International evidence 
 
The first record of abnormal initial return of an IPO dated back to 1963 in a 
special study by the United States Security and Exchange Commission. Since 
then, stock underpricing has been found in many markets in both developed and 
developing economies. Depending on market conditions, the degree of 
underpricing varies (Loughran et al. 2010). The following Figure 7 describes the 
average first day return of IPO stocks on a number of countries. Among 
developed countries, results show that the average first day increase of stocks 
ranges from 6.5 percent in Austria to as high as 50.8 percent in Greece and 63.5 
percent in South Korea. In Finland, a sample of 162 IPOs between 1971 and 2006 
logs an initial return of 17.2 percent. Overall, investors in developed markets see 
an average of 16 percent in initial returns (Loughran et al. 2010). 
 
 
 37 
 
 
FIGURE 7. Average first day returns of IPOs in sample countries (adapted from 
Loughran et al. 2010). 
 
 
The situation in developing countries is more dramatic. Loughran et al. (2010) 
puts the initial return in the Russian market at 4.2 percent, the lowest among these 
countries. In the same study, investors in Brazil, Thailand, Malaysia and India can 
expect a first day closing price of 35.8 percent, 36.6 percent, 69.6 percent and 
92.7 percent higher than the offering price. At top of the chart, the level of 
underpricing in China is almost 156 percent. Another study shows an even more 
phenomenal figure: a sample of 308 Chinese IPOs between 1987 and 1995 has a 
mean first day return of 948.6 percent (Su et al., 174). Accordingly, investors who 
follow a simple strategy of buying the IPOs and selling these stocks at the first 
trading day can realize a profit nine times the starting investment. Although 
underpricing pattern in developed countries is more consistent according to Figure 
7, offshore investors can expect to find some of the highest initial returns in exotic 
markets. 
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4 CASE STUDY - HO CHI MINH STOCK EXCHANGE 
 
This chapter presents a general overview of the case study - Ho Chi Minh Stock 
Exchange - as well as its listed companies. Furthermore, this part gives an insight 
of the price setting mechanism that dictates the valuation of share prices of all 
IPOs in Vietnam, especially SOEs who form the majority in the sample 
companies. 
4.1 Overview of Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange 
 
Established in 2000, and then named Ho Chi Minh City Stock Trading Center, 
HOSE is the first and foremost dedicated equity trading platform in Vietnam. It 
was the only stock exchange in Vietnam until 2005, when HNX was inaugurated. 
Although run as a limited company, HOSE is under state control and is supervised 
by the State Securities Commission (SSC), which is administrated by the Ministry 
of Finance. HOSE was elevated to a full exchange in 2007, and took the current 
name to reflect this change. (Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange 2011a.) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8. Number of stocks and market capitalization of HOSE in 2006-2010 
(HSBC 2010, 11). 
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Nowadays HOSE is the biggest national stock exchange in Vietnam, handling 262 
stocks with daily trading volume exceeds EUR 35 million. While HNX 
outnumbers HOSE in term of number of stocks, the Hanoi-based exchange trails 
HOSE in market capitalization: total market capitalization of 346 companies on 
HNX is EUR 4 billion, four times less than the EUR 19 billion market value of 
262 stocks on HOSE. (HSBC 2010, 11.) On the other hand, the total market value 
of all listed companies in Vietnam adds up to only 23.1 percent of total gross 
domestic product (GDP), a figure well below many markets in the regions (World 
Bank 2011). As such, there is plenty of room for the capital markets to expand. 
Even if this percentage stays the same from now till 2050, total market 
capitalization of listed companies in 2050 will be EUR 654 billion, of which 
HOSE’s market value is EUR 540 billion. This projection translates to a growth of 
109 percent on a year-by-year basis for the next 40 years, with GDP growth is at 
8.8 percent annually at the same time (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2011, 9). 
Although the figure seems remarkable, it is dwarfed by historical growth of 
HOSE itself: the HOSE grew in size around 32 times in four and a half years 
between 2006 and 2010 (HSBC 2010, 12). 
 
 
TABLE 3. Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) (World Bank 
2011). 
Countries Market capitalization of listed 
companies (% of GDP) 
Asia Pacific  
Vietnam 23.1% 
Malaysia 133.6% 
Thailand 52.4% 
Philippines 49.9% 
Singapore 170.5% 
China 100.5% 
Japan 66.7% 
HongKong SAR, China 617% 
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Others 
Finland 38.3% 
France 74.4% 
United Kingdom 128.6% 
United States 105.8% 
India 90% 
Brazil 74.3% 
Russia 70% 
 
 
In term of market composition, HOSE is skewed towards the financial sector, 
whose companies constitute more than 50 percent of the total market 
capitalization. The consumer staples sector is a distant second with a 14 percent 
share, followed by industrials and materials with 12 percent and 10 percent shares, 
respectively. (HSBC 2010, 14-17.) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 9. HOSE - Sector composition in term of market capitalization (HSBC 
2010, 12). 
 
 
Noticeably, in spite of the acceleration of privatization of SOEs in Vietnam, SOEs 
still account for a large proportion of companies on HOSE with approximately 
100 firms. The two largest firms are state-owned, and five in ten of the biggest 
companies are controlled by the government (Stockbiz 2011). 
14 %
12 %
10 %
4 %
10 %
50 %
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Industrials
Materials
Consumer Discretionary
Others
Financials
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TABLE 4. State ownership of the top ten companies on HOSE by market 
capitalization (Stockbiz 2011a – Stockbiz 2011j). 
Company name State ownership 
BaoViet Finance-Insurance Group 74.17% 
Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam 90.72% 
Vincom JSC 0.00% 
Masan Group Corporation 0.00% 
Vietnam Joint Stock Commercial Bank For Industrial And Trade 89.23% 
Vietnam Dairy Products JSC 46.83% 
Hoang Anh Gia Lai JSC 0.00% 
Vietnam Export Import Commercial Joint Stock Bank 0.00% 
Petrovietnam Fertilizer and Chemical Corporation 60.05% 
Saigon Thuong Tin Commercial Jointstock Bank 0.01% 
 
 
Such a prominent presence of SOEs indicates that investors should spend extra 
attention to their IPOs. In the next subchapters, various issues surrounding an IPO 
of a SOE will be discussed.  
4.2 Initial public offerings by mean of state-owned companies’ privatizations 
 
Vietnam has two types of companies, SOEs and private-owned enterprises (POEs) 
that can initiate public offerings. The process is straightforward for POEs and 
largely follows the procedure described in Chapter 2. However, the case of SOEs’ 
IPOs is more complicated due to more specific regulations on the IPO process. 
Still, a majority of IPOs in Vietnam are from SOEs’ privatizations, thus making 
examining their cases worthwhile (Huy 2010).  
 
Decree 109/2007/ND-CP of the Government on conversion of state-owned 
companies into shareholding companies provides the guideline on the 
privatization process by means of offering shares to public. According to the 
decree, the privatization process of a SOE starts with the approval of the 
government authorizing the share offering. There are three types of privatizations 
that require a public offering: IPO with 100 percent new share, IPO with partial 
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sales of government’s stake and IPO with all shares coming from government 
possession. Next, an IPO Committee will be established by the company to 
oversee the whole process, which includes preparing legal documents, selecting 
an investment bank and auditor and supervising the valuation of the firm. (Decree 
109/2007/ND-CP, point 3.) 
 
The valuation of the IPO is a crucial responsibility of the IPO Committee and 
often begins right after the privatization approval. A company can undertake a 
variety of valuation methods which it sees fit for the firm’s situation. However, 
SOEs are allowed to use mainly two methods to determine the company value, 
and hence the IPO price: discounted cash flow method and the asset-based 
valuation method (Decree 109/2007/ND-CP, point 23). In asset-based valuation 
method, the SOE’s value is based on financial records at the time of privatization, 
taking into account market value of all assets minus all liabilities (Decree 
109/2007/ND-CP, section 2). The asset-based valuation is based on readily 
available information which is fairly recent, and therefore is simple to compute. 
However, the utilization of such a method does not take into account the added 
value of the company, particularly its future prospects (Thuy 2010). As a result, 
discounted cash flow valuation is used as a remedy, even though it requires more 
documentations and efforts.  
 
In order to do a discounted valuation, decree 109/2007/ND-CP, point 34 requires 
some prerequisites from the company. First, financial statements of five years 
prior to the time of privatization are required for the valuation. Second, the decree 
demands the availability of a three to five year business plan after the SOE 
becomes a public company. Third, the interest rate used in this method is long 
term government bond at the nearest date from the IPO. As one of the 
requirements stresses the availability of financial statements for five years prior to 
IPO, this method is not possible for young SOEs whose operational history is less 
than this period. Nevertheless this drawback has little effect on the evaluation of 
SOEs since the vast majority of SOEs have a well-established history prior to 
privatizations. (Thuy 2010.) More specifically, only five companies or 10 percent 
of all cases in this study have operated for five years or less at the time of their 
initial offerings.  
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Afterward, the IPO Committee has to submit registration documents and a 
prospectus to the SSC for approval. According to point 27 of decree 
109/2007/ND-CP, an initial public offering has to offer a minimum of 20 percent 
of its registered capital. While pending approval, the issuer is permitted to arrange 
road shows for marketing purpose as well as for price exploration. Market 
information gathered in those road shows can be used to correct the initial offer 
price in the submitted prospectus; however this correction has to be done before 
the approval. Otherwise, the issuers have to resubmit the reviewed registration 
documents, and wait again for approval. Once the offer is approved, the issuer has 
to complete the IPO within three months. (Decree 109/2007/ND-CP, point 44.) 
4.3 Price setting mechanism and stock allocation 
 
The main price setting mechanism of IPOs in Vietnam is auction, specifically 
discriminatory auction. In this bidding scheme, potential investors register with 
the issuers, specifying their desired quantity of shares as well as the price they are 
willing to pay for each share. After all demands are collected, the issuers will start 
allocating stocks to the highest bidder, then to the second-highest bidder and so on 
until all the auctioned shares are distributed. If there are several investors who bid 
at the same price, and there are not enough shares to allocate at that price, then 
each buyer will receive a number of shares in proportion of their intended 
purchasing quantity. However, there exists an initial minimum price which is 
stated in the prospectus. If there is not enough demand on the shares at a higher 
price, the issuers will refuse to sell the remaining shares lower than this minimum. 
(Huy 2010.)  
 
As such, under this price setting mechanism, companies are exposed to an 
undersubscribed scenario where the demand for shares is inadequate, thereby 
lowering the IPO proceeds. This puts discriminatory auction at a disadvantage 
compared to bookbuilding method, in which issuers are certain about the 
subscription rate before carrying the IPOs. Nevertheless, since the stocks are 
allocated to the highest bidders first, this mechanism potentially decreases 
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underpricing level as investors are forced to bid the stocks nearer their fair value 
in order not to lose the auction. (Huy 2010.) 
 
The auction process in Vietnam starts with the announcement of SSC’s approval 
of the offering. Next, the issuers will begin to distribute prospectuses to interested 
parties, as well as making documentation available at the company’s premises, 
stock auction centers (in all cases a stock exchange, whether HOSE or HNX), and 
on the company’s website. Once the official auction commences, investors have 
five days to register for participation. First of all, they have to fill in a registration 
form for auction participation at the auction affiliates’ registration place or on 
stock exchange’s website where the auction will be held. Foreign institutions and 
individuals are also required to submit proof of their possession of a Vietnam 
Dong (VND) – nominated domestic bank account. Secondly, investors deposit 10 
percent of total share value which they intend to buy at the minimum price. The 
deposit should be in VND and paid to the account of the auction organizer, in this 
case the IPO’s investment bank. After completing registration, buyers will receive 
an auction slip certifying their rights to participate in the auction. (HOSE 2011.) 
 
The auction takes place using the above mentioned price setting mechanism. 
Successful investors have 15 days to pay the full amount for the shares they bid. If 
they fail to pay within this period, the issuers will not allocate shares to these 
buyers, plus they will lose the deposit to the amount of shares unpaid. On the 
other hand, unsuccessful bidders will receive their deposit from the issuers in full 
within five days of auction result disclosure day. (HOSE 2011.) 
 
One feature of Vietnamese auctioned IPOs is the preferential treatment of a 
privileged group of investors. They are company’s executives, employees and 
strategic investors, which may or may not include foreign investors. Executives 
and employees are entitled to buy 100 shares per employed year at the company at 
the discounted price. For example, an executive who works for the firm for 30 
years is allowed to buy 3000 shares. The discount price is set at 60 percent of the 
average successful bidding price, or market clearing price. Strategic investors are 
entitled to this preferential treatment too, and can buy up to 20 percent of all stock 
offered at the market clearing price, thus avoiding the bidding procedure. If these 
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preferred buyers wish to buy more shares than those allocated to them, they have 
to participate in the auction and go through bidding process like normal investors, 
though. (Decree 109/2007/ND-CP, section 5.) Besides, foreign investors are 
restricted by regulations from owning a controlling stake in a public company. 
This means that if an IPO offers 100 percent of existing shares for the public, a 
foreign investor can only buy up to 49 percent of the total shares and only up to 
30 percent in the case of a bank. (Thuy 2010.)  
4.4 Listing requirements 
 
HOSE’s listing requirements are the strictest in Vietnam, and thus ensure that 
listed companies on HOSE attain a particular quality. For instance, unprofitable 
companies are not allowed to list on the exchange, and a company must disclose 
its plan to repay all overdue debt prior to listing approval. (HSBC 2011, 51.) 
 
 
TABLE 5. HOSE’s listing requirements (HSBC 2011, 51). 
Requiremets  
Admission 
criteria 
 Minimum book value of VND80 billion for the last two 
consecutive years.  
 No accumulated losses up to the year of listing. 
 Overdue debt must be earmarked for payment from existing 
reserves and disclosures should be made regarding debts 
owned. 
 At least 20% of the voting shares of the applicant company 
must be held by no less than 100 shareholders. 
 Shareholder who is an executive should not sell any shares for 
six months after listing and sell no more than 50% of his/her 
shares in the following six months. 
 The applicant company has to submit a completed application 
file. 
 
Approval time  Within 30 days of submitting the application, HOSE is required 
to issue its decision. If there is any material change, the 
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applicant has to resubmit the application 
 
Quotation  Once the listing is approved, offering should be completed 
within 90 days of the approval date. 
 The notice of approval should be made public within five 
working days from the date of approval. 
 Service fees must be paid to the exchange within five working 
days from the approval date. 
 The shareholder register book must be submitted to HOSE. 
 
Pricing and 
Trading 
 The applicant company will determine and announce the 
offering price which will be the reference price of first day of 
trading. 
 The transaction price must not be more than or less than 20% of 
the reference on the first day. 
 
 
After the completion of the IPO, the newly public company can choose to go on 
an exchange immediately, or remain unlisted. Many Vietnamese IPOs choose not 
to be listed on any exchange for many years after the offering date, which ex-
plains the small sample size of listed IPOs out of a large pool of finished public 
offerings. Out of a total of 877 auctions, including 156 auctions documented by 
HOSE, 104 documented by HNX and 357 documented by SSC, only 56 
companies offered IPOs and then listed on HOSE. Another reason for this listing 
reluctance is because of stringent listing requirements of HOSE, which chooses to 
list only profitable and transparent companies. 
 
In summary, the case of Vietnam Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Industry and 
Trade (Vietinbank) serves as an illustration of a typical IPO in Vietnam. 
Vietinbank’s IPO was initiated at the beginning of 2007 with the approval of the 
Vietnamese government. The final plan was approved in September 2008. On 16 
December 2008, the issuers arranged a road show to present the company’s IPO 
and start distributing the prospectus to interested investors. The minimum price 
for the upcoming auction was set at VND 20,000 and total number of stocks was 
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53,600,000. (Vietinbank 2011a.) The auction day was set on 25 December 2008. 
At the end of the auction day, all offered stocks were bought with the average 
winning bid, or market clearing price, was VND 20,265 (Ho Chi Minh Stock 
Exchange 2011b). 
 
However, the stocks were not listed immediately after the auction. Instead, 
Vietinbank waited until 2009 and only then did it send registration documents 
asking for listing on HOSE. The bank had to submit a new prospectus as part of 
the required documents, in which it specified a nominated price for the first 
trading day. As stocks’ price on the first trading day cannot increase or decrease 
more than 20 percent according to HOSE’s regulation, an initial price is needed. 
Most noticeably, this initial price is not necessarily similar to the market clearing 
price. In the case of Vietinbank, the company decided that the stock’s initial price 
would be VND 50,000. (Vietinbank 2011b.) Consequently, the stock’s price could 
fluctuate from VND 40,000 to VND 60,000 with the 20 percent trading cap. In 
fact, the final price of the first trading day of Vietinbank’s stock was VND 
40,100, slightly higher than the minimum price. Even so, this price was 97 percent 
higher than the market clearing price. If IPO investors decided to sell their stocks 
at the first listing day, their return on investment (ROI) rate would be 97 percent. 
Considering that the investment time was seven months, this return rate was 
nonetheless remarkable. 
4.5 Collection of eligible initial public offerings 
 
Necessary data for the investigation is collected from a number of different 
sources. Information on historical auctioned IPOs between 2005 and 2009 is 
collected from the database of HOSE, HNX and the SSC. This data covers auction 
dates, size of auctions, average successful bid price and date of listings. Out of a 
total of 877 auctions, including 156 auctions documented by HOSE, 104 
documented by HNX and 357 documented by SSC, 56 auctions fit the criteria. 
This sample represents auctions of 56 companies which subsequently listed on 
HOSE. Among them, one company merged with another company in the sample 
and therefore has not been counted. Consequently, the final sample consists of 55 
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auctions of 55 companies. These companies represent 98 percent of companies 
that offered IPOs and then listed on HOSE.  
 
Next, daily price movement and closing price on HOSE for companies in the data 
sample are assembled from FPT Securities and StoxPlus, some of the most 
comprehensive databases of financial information in Vietnam. A company’s 
information such as size, age and industry is collected from its prospectus, which 
companies had to submit to HOSE prior to listing. As such, HOSE’s database is 
the chief source to collect this information. 
 
There are several reasons for this small sample in comparison to the initial 
collection. First of all, the database of SSC contains auctions on both HOSE and 
HNX, and is used to cross-check the data sample from HOSE and HNX. 
Secondly, while some companies auctioned on HNX and then listed on HOSE, the 
vast majority of IPOs on HNX is either listed on HNX, or still not listed. While 
there are some auctions dating back to prior 2005, the databases from HOSE and 
HNX official sources only record auctions from 2005 onwards. Additionally, the 
author chooses the year 2009 to mark the end of the data sample date in order to 
find sufficient data on price movement. 
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5 RETURN RATE OF VIETNAMESE INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
 
A common method to investigate the underpricing level is to measure the 
difference of the closing price at the specific date in question with the offering 
price and then divide the result by the offer price. Recent IPO underpricing 
studies, which utilize this model, in China (Cheng 2010, 144) and Bangladesh 
(Islam et al. 2010, 39) further entrenches the versatility of such a model in a 
developing scenario. 
 
    
         
    
 
 
 Rs,t : the return of stock s in the period t 
 Ps,t : the price of stock s in the end of period t 
 Ps,0 : the initial offer price of stock s 
 
The most popular choice for period t is one day, which is evident in numerous 
researches about underpricing described in Figure 7 in page 37. However, plain 
utilization of this time frame in Vietnam’s environment is insufficient. Its main 
setback rests in the fact that this period is only suitable in markets where price 
movement is unconstrained. For instance, the closing price on the first trading day 
can rocket to 698 percent of the offered IPO price, as in the case of VA Linux in 
United States’ market (Bodie et al. 2005, 69). However, there is a trading cap in 
Vietnamese stock exchanges that dictates the maximum and minimum amount of 
price movement. On HOSE, common stocks are only allowed to increase or 
decrease by five percent of the previous trading day’s price (Ho Chi Minh Stock 
Exchange 2011c). 
 
Nonetheless, there is an exception for stocks that are traded for the first time, in 
which the price can fluctuate to a maximum of 20 percent based on the initial 
listing price (Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange 2011c). Thus all IPOs in this study are 
only accepted to rise no higher than 20 percent on the first trading day. As such, if 
there is a newly listed stock with a similar underpricing level to that of VA Linux, 
the market will need a total of 138 days to return the stock value to its true worth. 
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Clearly, the first trading day price movement cannot fully reflect the level of 
underpricing on HOSE. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, the first day price 
movement is still taken into account in order to provide an equivalent comparison 
with other markets. Nonetheless, the full degree of underpricing could only be 
seen in a longer period, which provides more room for price movement. This 
justification motivates the author to include other time frames in this study. The 
periods of choice include 10 trading days, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months and 1 
year. Moreover, most studies in Chapter 2 show that underpricing is a short-term 
phenomenon, making the inclusion of longer periods unnecessary. The highest 
average initial return ever recorded is 948 percent in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in the period 1992-1995 (Su et al. 1999, 174). Even if IPOs in Vietnam 
have such a dramatic degree of underpricing, a 6-month time frame with a five 
percent increase daily is more than enough to reveal a similar degree. Even so, the 
author decided to include a one year time frame in anticipation of an even higher 
initial return rate. 
5.1 Return rate of Vietnamese initial public offerings 
 
Data gathered from the sample IPOs in Chapter 4 are used as the input for the 
above mentioned formula. Afterwards, descriptive statistics are used to describe 
the results. Investigation on price movement of stocks on the initial listing period 
yields the following result:  
 
 
TABLE 6. Descriptive statistics on initial return of Vietnamese IPOs. 
Tim period Range Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness 
1
st
 day 9.5821 -.9482 8.6339 .6987 2.0112 2.613 
10
th
 days 10.6183 -.9469 9.6714 .7723 2.1243 2.404 
1 month 13.5766 -.9410 12.6357 .9255 2.5025 2.739 
3 months 21.3538 -.9369 20.4169 1.0084 3.1724 4.613 
6 months 18.8619 -.9646 17.8973 .7630 2.8212 4.560 
1 year 11.4550 -.9684 10.4866 .4802 1.8656 3.338 
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As can be seen from Table 6, initial returns among the time periods represent a 
wide spectrum, from a 1-year average return of 48 percent to a spectacular 100.8 
percent average return within 3 months of trading. Overall, all periods reveal a 
positive initial return, which confirms the presence of the underpricing practice in 
Vietnam. However, such a wide spectrum also indicates that newly listed stocks 
are volatile, which adds to financial risks that investors may have to bear.  
 
According to the statistics, the average initial return for the first trading day is 70 
percent. It ranges from a minimum of -95 percent to a maximum of 863 percent, 
resulting in a very large spread of 958 percent between both ends. The result 
comes as a surprise, as the author did not anticipate such a high price movement 
on the first day, especially since IPO stocks are only allowed to increase or 
decrease a maximum 20 percent on the first trading day. Nevertheless, this 
incident could be explained by the fact that IPO issuers are required by law to 
submit a second prospectus as part of listing requirements. In this listing 
prospectus, the company has to set a suggested listing price for its stocks, which 
will be used as a base from which price swings. This listing price is subjected to 
renewed valuation, and thus may be different from the market clearing price in the 
IPO’s auction. 
 
On a longer period, initial return jumps to 77 percent at the 10th trading day, with 
the minimum return rate is unchanged while the maximum return rate increases 10 
percent. More importantly, there is a decrease in skewness level, which suggests 
that initial returns of stocks are more evenly distributed. In fact, this skewness 
level is the lowest among the examined periods. As such, it is safe to say that 
initial return of stocks is most uniform in 10-day period, which thereby increases 
the consistency of trends in underpricing level. Such a consistency is very 
important in this study, as it will clear any abnormal behaviors in price movement 
that not only have insignificant affect on underpricing level, but also distort the 
cohesiveness of underpricing determinants’ effects. 
 
Overall, the trend in increased initial return continues past the first trading month, 
and peaks after 3 months at 97 percent. This trend shows a notable increase in the 
return between the period of 1 month and 10 days, in comparison to a more 
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modest rise in the period between the 1st and 10th day. Investors with a holding 
period longer than three months fare worse than shorter term investors. 
Consequently, investors who still own IPO stocks one year after the listing fare 
the worst, realizing only a 44 percent profit. The trend again confirms that 
underpricing is a short-term phenomenon although it takes more time for 
Vietnamese markets to correct underpriced stocks. If authorities allowed 
unrestricted price movement on HOSE, this trend would end considerably sooner. 
Given the development rate of HOSE nowadays, the author does not see any 
reason for change in market trading cap in the immediate future. Yet the move 
toward free price fluctuation is inevitable, and sooner or later this feature will be 
implemented in conformity with other equity markets in the world. 
 
On a case-by-case basis, the highest recorded initial return is 2041 percent and 
belongs to Petro Vietnam Drilling & Well Service Joint Stock Company, a state-
owned company. On the opposite, the highest overpricing level recorded in this 
study belongs to stocks of Cotec Construction Joint Stock Company, a former 
state-owned company. Overall, companies which are state-owned or former state-
owned make up the majority of IPOs in Vietnam. In this study, out of a sample of 
55 IPO cases, 54 companies have some ties to the government. Only one company 
is owned by individuals: Kinh Do Corporation, whose stocks’ first day return is 
36 percent, less than half of the average return.  
 
 
TABLE 7. Descriptive statistics of underpricing and overpricing incidents. 
 Underpricing Overpricing 
Number of companies 30 25 
Average level of underpricing/overpricing 1.6946 -0.0652 
Maximum 8.6339 -0.9482 
Minimum 0.0231 -0.4964 
Standard deviation 2.2801 0.3030 
Skewness 2.109 -0.143 
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Most importantly, the study finds that the offering shares are overpriced in nearly 
half of the sample IPOs. The average overpricing in these cases is 30 percent 
which nonetheless is sizeable. In the most extreme case, Cotec Construction JSC’s 
IPO decreased more than 94 percent in the first trading day. At the other end, the 
minimum overpricing stands at 6.5 percent. The spread in underpricing level is 
even more dramatic, with the most undervalued stock is priced 863 percent lower 
than its real value and the least undervalued stock is priced at two percent lower 
than its worth. Since the price of a newly listed stock can swing over 20 percent, 
this tiny gain in the first day can hardly be seen as a sign of undervaluation. 
 
Even though the spread in underpricing level is more dramatic, skewness level for 
underpriced stocks shows a higher value than that of overpriced stocks. In fact, 
skewness level of overpriced stocks is only -0.143, exhibits a more even 
distribution as this figure is closer to 0. On the other hand, skewness level of 
underpricing incidences is 2.109, suggesting that the strong average initial return 
of underpriced stocks is due to particularly high price movement of a handful of 
IPO cases. As such, this fact shows that the overpricing trend is more consistent 
than the underpricing trend, which relies more on particular cases than an even 
distribution of underpricing level across samples. 
 
 
TABLE 8. Number of underpriced and overpriced IPOs in 2005-2009. 
Year Number of 
IPOs 
Underpriced 
IPOs 
Underpricing 
level 
Overpriced 
IPOs 
Overpricing 
level 
2005 14 9 +266.24% 5 -56.41% 
2006 15 10 +188.50% 5 -74.12% 
2007 20 6 +41.91% 14 -40.13% 
2008 5 4 +102.02% 1 -26.67% 
2009 1 1 +143.00% - - 
 
 
On a yearly basis, Table 8 shows that initial public offerings are most numerous in 
2007, following by 2006’s and 2005’s figures. With the financial crisis in full 
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effect by the year 2008, this year and 2009 have the least number of IPOs. 
Nevertheless, IPOs in the last two years are considerably priced lower: four out of 
five IPOs in 2008 are underpriced. Although 2007 saw the most deals going 
through, a majority of the stocks are overpriced. Of 20 IPOs in 2007, the prices of 
14 IPOs are higher than their real value. Yet the average overpricing level is lower 
than that of other more successful years: while 2005 and 2006 each has only 5 
overpriced IPO, their average overvaluations are 56 percent and 74 percent 
respectively. These rates are both higher than the figure in 2007 with the average 
overpricing level of 14 IPOs only 40 percent. Overall, the result represents an 
interesting trend: unfavorable international market conditions lower the incidence 
of overpriced stocks. Moreover, all underpriced IPOs in 2008 and 2009 posted a 
satisfactory initial return rate. Evidently, the issuers are more reluctant to 
overprice their shares and more prone to underpricing when market conditions are 
bad. This in turn explains the surge in initial return in 2008 from a below average 
rate in 2007. 
 
Although IPOs in 2005 and 2006 provide the best initial return rate, the author 
finds IPOs’ return rate in 2008 more desirable. While profit is nearly three times 
the investment in 2005, profitable deals only account for 64 percent of all cases. 
This figure increased to 80 percent in 2008, and investors still enjoy an above 
average return rate at 102 percent. Even if they buy an overpriced stock, the 
overpricing level is still only half the nearest overpricing level in other years. 
Return rate for 2009’s IPOs is very worthwhile, yet the number of IPOs in 2009 is 
too low to generalize a convincing trend.  
 
In summary, the analysis shows that ROI in IPO stocks is very desirable, which 
corresponds to a high underpricing level. However, further researches reveal a 
disturbing scene: the IPO market in Vietnam is volatile and risky. Without proper 
research, a potential investor would run into an unprofitable IPO deal roughly half 
the time. Moreover, while the overpricing trend is more predictable, the 
underpricing trend is less clear and relies more on a case-by-case analysis. 
Nevertheless, the exact intention of this study is to find credible factors that affect 
the underpricing level. With the aid of these determinants, investors will be able 
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to identify favorable deals, and therefore reduce their failure rate. The exploration 
of these factors is described in Chapter 6 of this study. 
5.2 Comparison of return rates of initial public offerings in Vietnam and other 
markets 
 
In Chapter 5, the author has reviewed initial return rates of various markets in the 
world. This subchapter put these figures against the initial return rate on HOSE, as 
described in Figure 10. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 10. Average first-day returns of IPOs in Vietnam and other markets 
(adapted from Loughran et al. 2010). 
 
 
In previous part of this chapter, the result reveals that average first day return of 
Vietnamese IPOs in the period between 2005 and 2009 is 70 percent. This figure 
surpasses initial returns on most markets in Asia Pacific, rivaling Malaysia and 
falling just behind China. More specifically, the initial return on Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange is 69.6 percent, on par with HOSE’s figure at 69.8 percent. These 
figures are the highest among South East Asian countries, exceeding those of 
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comparable markets in Philippines and Indonesia, and those of more sophisticated 
markets in Thailand and Singapore as well. 
 
Another comparison with the four most progressive developing countries put the 
Vietnam’s figure above that of Brazil and Russia, but below China and India. 
However, the most up to date Indian figure dates back to 2007, preceding the 
financial crisis of 2008. Thus a more precise comparison requires a newer data set 
from the Indian market.  
 
The result shows that public offerings in Vietnam are substantially priced below 
their potential value. This undervaluation puts investors in Vietnamese IPOs at a 
more favorable position than their counterparts in other markets in Asia. For 
instance, the difference in initial return between Vietnam’s and Singapore’s 
markets is more than 30 percent. The figure is as high as 65 percent in comparison 
with Russian exchanges. In conclusion, the author finds that those who invest in 
Vietnamese private companies’ stocks at the time of IPO are very well rewarded. 
5.3 Complications for international investors 
5.3.1 Restricted share quantity 
 
An important restriction for foreign investors is the limited ownership in a public 
company in Vietnam. As stated in decision 55/2009/QD-TTg and decree 
69/2007/ND-CP, all foreign investors can only own up to 49 percent of a 
company’s stocks, and up to 30 percent if the company is a bank (Decision 
55/2009/QD-TTg, point 2; Decree 69/2007/ND-CP, section 1). While this 
regulation does not have any imminent effect on stock liquidity, it certainly 
restricts the ability to purchase IPOs’ shares. From an investor’s point of view, the 
restriction significantly affects economies of scale, and may force investors to 
spread their capital over several IPOs to get the desired investing rate.  
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On the other hand, this spread decreases failure risk if the investor concentrates on 
only one IPO and distributes the risk on several IPOs, thereby enhancing the 
return rate. Moreover, findings in the previous part have demonstrated that initial 
return peaked at around three months and then decreased. As such, this restriction 
on shares affects largely long-term investors who try to control the company, but 
not short term investors who rely on the underpricing notion for immediate profit. 
5.3.2 Time lag between auction and listing dates 
 
Among IPOs in this study, it takes an average 479 days, or approximately one 
year and three months, for a new Vietnamese public company to go on an 
exchange. In the most extreme case the issuers waited for almost five years before 
deciding to list their stocks on the market. The fastest issuers listed their stocks on 
HOSE two months after the completion of the IPOs. 
 
This practice differentiates HOSE from other more developed markets, whose 
time lag between the completion of IPOs and the listing date is often insignificant 
and is counted in weeks. In Vietnam’s case, this time lag exposes IPO purchasers 
to unknown risks, as company performance differs from time to time (Thuy 
2010). Moreover, before a stock is listed it can only be traded over the counter, or 
directly between individuals with or without a broker. As such, this limits stock 
liquidity, and sellers will have difficulties finding other buyers at that time. Time 
lag also has another implication: it tends to reduce underpricing. Results in Tian’s 
study have showed a negative correlation between the length of time from the IPO 
date to the listing date and the level of underpricing (Tian 2005, 26). As such, this 
fact also potentially lowers the return for IPO buyers.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
Investment is an important activity in that it stimulates economic growth and 
creates wealth for individuals. It is also a sophisticated and complicated activity, 
requiring a variety of tools as well as extensive research and knowledge in order 
to carry out. However, investors in emerging markets face a serious shortage of 
both manpower and market knowledge, of which the latter is more severe (Huy 
2010). This study is conducted with the purpose of assisting those who are 
considering investing in Vietnamese capital markets. Specifically, the author 
examines a phenomenon that has been associated with a lucrative investment 
option, which is underpricing and IPO, respectively. The findings in previous 
chapters will be discussed further in this part. 
 
While findings are conclusive and promising, the author acknowledges that there 
are still many factors that need to be examined prior to investing in an IPO. In this 
chapter, further research topics are also addressed to pave the way for a fuller 
understanding about the issue. 
6.1 Investment decision 
 
The study finds that a high underpricing level in Vietnam has created an 
invaluable investment opportunity for international investors. The ROI in 
Vietnamese IPOs stands at 70 percent, which is higher than most markets in Asia 
Pacific. Moreover, this study examines Vietnamese IPOs both before and during 
the financial crisis of 2008, and hence has taken into account substantial financial 
risks. The author anticipates an even higher return rate with the emergence of the 
world economy’s stabilization that took place at the end of 2009. As the 
Vietnamese economy prospects brighten, investment opportunities will also 
multiply. 
 
The author also addresses two most important things for foreign investors: 
regulations and market volatility. Although there are regulations that restrict 
foreign ownership of stocks as well as price movement on stock exchanges, these 
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restrictions are of little concern for short-term investors. Findings in Chapter 5 
have shown that underpricing is a short-term phenomenon and reveals substantial 
profits only in a short period. As a result, an IPO stock is best suited for investors 
with a relatively brief investing interval. Furthermore, the author has clarified the 
participation procedure in IPO, thus easing the investing process. At a glance, the 
study finds that HOSE is a volatile and risky market, which also manifests in a 
high return rate. Nevertheless, further examination in Chapter 6 has shown that 
these risks can be easily avoided if buyers follow certain patterns. 
 
In summary, the author strongly recommends buying Vietnamese IPO stocks as 
an investment strategy. ROI is excellent, and empirical study in determinant 
factors of underpricing level has shown that with proper research, investors can 
substantially reduce risks. On the whole, investors following this strategy will find 
that they fare better than their counterparts in other markets in Asia Pacific.  
6.2 Future research possibilities 
 
Risks for international investors 
 
While the initial returns of Vietnamese IPOs are very desirable, the author 
acknowledges that investing in an international environment carries many 
potential uncertainties, such as changing regulations and currency exchange rate 
fluctuation. When taken into account, those risks may decimate the return rate, or 
even wipe out the whole investment. There are too many incidents that keep us 
aware of the volatility of foreign markets; some of them are very recent. The 
Asian financial crisis of 1997, the Russian debt default of 1998, and the late 
financial crisis of 2008, all leave a bitter taste to offshore investors. Moreover, 
every country has its own characteristics which can alter investing conditions. 
This is particularly true for Vietnam, which has a modified centrally planned 
economy. 
 
As a result, the author believes that it is essential to have an in-depth assessment 
of possible risks associated with Vietnamese capital markets in general and with 
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public offerings in particular. These threats include operational risk and financial 
risk. On one hand, operational risks such as legal risk may pose a problem to 
offshore investors due to the looseness of regulations in Vietnam. On the other 
hand, common financial risks may amplify in a hot, new capital markets like 
Vietnam. These risks include currency risk, default risk, liquidity risk and 
volatility risk, etc. Such a study will give a fuller evaluation on the desirability of 
venturing into Vietnam.  
 
Other determinants of IPO 
 
The result shows that a company’s age and size, size of the IPO offer, time lag 
between offering date and listing date and industry sector have a combined 50.4 
percent influence on underpricing level in Vietnam. In addition, it also points out 
that there are other determinants that account for the remaining 49.6 percent of the 
variations in IPO price. A discovery of these factors will complement this thesis, 
and thus give investors a more complete, powerful reference base for IPO 
evaluation. 
 
A starting point would be a further investigation on a company’s financial 
indicators prior to the IPO, which can reveal some of these unknown factors. 
These indicators include, but are not limited to: price/earning ratio, debt ratio, 
return on asset, return on equity rate and EBITDA (earning before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization). Moreover, socio-economic factors are also 
potential determinants. However, extensive mix method researches have to be 
done to indentify and transform these factors into numerical form, so that they can 
be incorporated into multiple regression analysis. 
 
Second offering 
 
As described in Chapter 3, one of the reason to underprice IPOs is to promote 
long term relationship with investors, who after reap a sizeable profit from IPOs 
will come back for subsequent offering. This strategy guarantees that later 
offerings will be welcomed by the public, and thus are more likely to be 
successful. However, the extent to which this strategy is effective remains 
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doubtful. If a company meets difficulties raising more capital even after a 
successful IPO, then its efforts in underpricing shares are not worthwhile. From a 
corporate point of view, this is a serious problem (Thuy 2010). 
 
Therefore, a study on the effectiveness of underpricing as a promotion tool for 
later offerings is necessary. The result of that study will prompt companies to 
reevaluate their IPO strategy, thereby having an impact on underpricing level. 
Overall, the author recommends this research possibility in order to balance 
investors’ benefits and a company’s needs. 
 
Long term performance of IPO stocks 
 
Long term performance of IPO stocks is a popular topic that often associates with 
underpricing. In general, researches to date find that IPO stocks underperform the 
market in the long term. As a result, stocks from newly listed companies are 
considered a poor long-term investment. 
 
However, recent study by Chan, Wei and Wang (2004, 428) shows the 
performance of IPO stocks is not necessarily low over years. In fact, long term 
performance of such stocks in Chinese and Canadian markets is even higher than 
the average market return in a three-year period (Chan et al. 2004, 428; Kooli, 
L’Her & Suret 2003, 21). So far in this study the author has discovered a 
decreasing trend in return rate, which started six months after the listing date. 
Nevertheless, this period is hardly considered long-term. Therefore, longer 
holding terms have to be examined before a conclusive answer is given. A 
research on this topic will benefit certain financial institutions, especially those 
who operate funds that have a long-term holding strategy such as index funds and 
closed-end funds. 
 
Underpricing in Hanoi Stock Exchange 
 
This study focuses on IPOs of HOSE, the major stock exchange in Vietnam. On a 
more local scale, HNX offers some very interesting companies. Due to less 
stringent listing requirements, companies on HNX tend to be younger, smaller and 
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less well-known than those listed on HOSE. Yet their short history also hints that 
they are growing faster than more mature companies. Moreover, these less well-
known firms also tend to price their IPO stocks lower, resulting in a higher 
underpricing level and higher initial return for investors, according to signaling 
hypothesis. In addition, a feature of HNX that some investors will find desirable is 
that it allows foreign investors own up to 49 percent of a public bank, whereas 
HOSE only allows a maximum 30 percent ownership stake. Furthermore, future 
expansion of the economy also means a similar enlargement of both exchanges 
and therefore liquidity, so that at some point investors will find HNX’s stock 
liquidity sufficient to carry a trade. In anticipation of such change, it is always 
good to start before the prime time comes so as to be sufficiently prepared.  
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7 SUMMARY 
 
This thesis exists to investigate the potential of Vietnamese IPOs as an investing 
channel. Moreover, the study investigates the presence of underpricing, a 
widespread financial phenomenon and its application in investing in the 
Vietnamese market. To that end, the findings have fulfilled the research questions.  
 
First of all, theoretical framework dominates the first part of this study. Various 
factors associated with IPO and underpricing phenomenon are discussed, in order 
to provide the basis for the empirical part. The IPO and its price setting 
mechanism are described in great detail so that investors can get a more familiar 
view on the process in Vietnam. Subsequently, underpricing is discussed with 
regard to reasons, influential factors and international evidence. Most importantly, 
the framework identifies possible determinants of underpricing, namely 
company’s age, company’s size, IPO size, time lag between IPO’s completion 
date and listing date, as well as industry composition. This knowledge is then put 
to use in settling the importance of individual determinants in the Vietnamese 
environment. 
 
In the second part, the author seeks answers for the research questions in the 
empirical study. The case study of Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange is presented 
together with its features that will have an impact on foreign investors. These 
features include price setting mechanism, auction process and the process of 
privatization, which contribute the vast majority of IPOs on HOSE. Knowledge of 
these features is indispensable in making investing decisions. 
 
Next, basing on IPOs that have been listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange, 
the author examines their initial price increase in various time frames, and pitches 
the return rate with other comparable markets. The result provides the answer to 
the first sub research question, in which the authors find the ROI rate on 
Vietnamese IPOs surpasses most markets in Asia Pacific. This prompts a very 
positive recommendation for international investors in the investing prospect of 
public offerings in Vietnam. 
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In conclusion, the author finds the prospect of investing in Vietnamese IPOs is 
excellent, with the ROI higher than most markets in Asia Pacific. To facilitate 
investing decisions, two portfolios of stocks are recommended for international 
investors. Based on the findings about determinants of underpricing, these 
portfolios summarize characteristics of a typical underpriced stock and provide 
some companies that fit in these criteria. Nonetheless, the author acknowledges 
that there are still many factors to consider prior to venturing into Vietnam’s 
equity markets. As such, he recommends several topics that build on the findings 
of this thesis for further research.  
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